What future, which technology? On the problem of describing relevant futures. by Stahl, Bernd Carsten, 1968-
 What Future?  Which Technology?  
 On the Problem of Describing Relevant Futures 
 
 
 Bernd Carsten Stahl 
 
 Centre for Computing and Social Responsibility, Department of Informatics, 
 De Montford University, Leicester, LE1 9BH, UK, bstahl@dmu.ac.uk 
 
Abstract.  Doing research on future and emerging technologies raises a number of 
significant ontological and epistemological challenges.  The fundamental uncer-
tainty of the future, combined with problems of appropriate descriptions of tech-
nology in general, render it difficult to come to an appropriate account of the likely 
shape and use of future technologies.  This paper discusses several streams of 
research that address this issue, including the question of relevant description and 
context, interpretive flexibility, affordances of technology, and multi-stability of 
technological trajectories.  The paper proposes that some of these problems may be 
addressed by using a democratic and participative approach to technology research 
and development.  Participative technology assessment is then discussed as an 
example of an established way of democratically engaging with technology 
stakeholders during research and development.  The paper concludes by discussing 
the promises and limitations of such a participative approach with regard to the 
question of understanding and researching future technologies. 
 




1  Introduction 
 
The core problem of researching the is that the future is, by definition, unknown.  
While it would doubtlessly be desirable to have certainty about the future, this can 
never be the case, simply because of the epistemic uncertainty of the future.  The 
initial response to the IFIP WG8.2 conference theme AResearching the Future@ is, 
therefore, what future?  Given the rapid development of technology, the technologies 
that may shape the (unknown) future are unlikely to be the same we have now.  This 
increases the uncertainty:  we are now looking at unknown information technology 
for an unknown future.  Briefly, we can know neither future information technologies 
nor any of the other aspects of the future.  At the same time, however, we need to 
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make decisions based on assessments of the future that will then, in turn, influence the 
way the future will turn out in practice.  This raises a number of practical problems on 
an individual, organizational, and political level.  These practical problems cannot be 
solved without due attention to the underlying philosophical issues that cause them. 
This paper addresses these core philosophical questions.  It starts out with a 
discussion of several theoretical positions that aim to describe the theoretical uncer-
tainty of the future, and in particular of future technologies.  The paper proposes that 
while individuals face a number of ontological and epistemological problems when 
assessing the future, collectively they may be in a better position to do so.  In addi-
tion, such collective perceptions of the future have the potential to provide a sound and 
legitimate basis for policy decisions.  Drawing on the literature in participatory 
technology assessment (pTA), different methods are discussed that can be used to 
address the problem.  This leads to the conclusion, which discusses the limitations of 
this approach and underlines its importance and implications for information systems 
research. 
The paper=s main contribution to the body of work on future technologies is its 
discussion of the different fundamental philosophical problems that are encountered 
when trying to identify emerging ICTs and provide descriptions of them.  An aware-
ness of these problems is important to understand the limitations and validity claims of 
about the future.  In addition, the paper develops the argument that these fundamental 
ontological and epistemological issues can be addressed by participative methods.  
These methods, some of which have been discussed and used in the area of 
information systems for considerable time, offer what may be our best bet to come to a 
reasonable understanding of the future and the role ICTs can play in shaping it. 
 
 
2  Descriptions of Future Technologies 
 
The fact that the future is not known is not particularly surprising by itself.  Aristotle=s 
study of temporal logic was caused by the observation that statements about the future 
have different properties from a-temporal statements.  Briefly, a statement 
concerning the future is, at the present moment, neither true nor false.  For example, 
the proposition Ait will rain tomorrow@ may or may not be true.  We can only know 
with certainty tomorrow.  The purpose of this paper is not to explore temporal logic 
or the general philosophical assessment of the future but to concentrate on future 
technologies.  This section discusses several alternative theories of why exact 
knowledge of future technologies is impossible.  This means that general issues of 
uncertainty of the future, such as the fact that we don=t know how a particular 
technology will be used in 10 years because by then the world may have come to an 
end, will not be discussed here.  But even disregarding such general issues, there are 
still a number of reasons why we cannot know future technologies with certainty. 
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An initial conceptual clarification required here concerns the concept of tech-
nology.  It is not the purpose of this paper to engage in the general philosophy of 
technology (Dusek 2006; Olsen et al. 2009).  Characteristics of technology that one 
can typically find include a basis in structured thought, temporal stability and 
reproducibility, and a reflection in artifacts which may (but do not have to be) of a 
physical nature.  Technologies are typically developed for specific ends.  This raises 
the question of the relationship between technologies and their application.  It is 
easily conceivable that a particular technological artefact can raise different questions 
depending on context and application of use but also on the technology=s conception 
and representation.   
Technologies are not fixed and objectively given.  The position that posits such 
an objectivity of technology, which would allow for a straightforward prediction of 
uses and consequences on the basis of the description of the technology, is often called 
technological determinism.  Adam (2001, p. 239) defines technological determinism 
as 
 
the perspective that views developments in technology as driving society; 
Aimpacts@ is the term often used.  Such impacts are seen as inevitable, the 
relationship of technology and society is regarded as linear and mono-
directional, i.e., from technology toward society.  
 
Technological determinism is generally agreed to be conceptually misleading and 
empirically untenable.  However, choosing a description of technology that is not 
determinist can lead to a number of problems.  The problems with which this paper is 
concerned are a combination of ontological and epistemological ones.  They are 
caused by the nature of technology (ontological) and the related issue of how we can 
know about it (epistemology).  Some of these issues are caused by the fact that the 
phenomenon in question is a future one; others are equally pertinent for present 
technology.  The paper will touch on the question of how one can know that an 
appropriate description of the technology in question was made.  This leads to a 
discussion of the problem of interpretive flexibility of technology, followed by the 
related issue of multi-stability of technology.   
All of these questions are highly theoretical and require abstract conceptuali-
zations.  In order to make it easier for the reader to follow the argument, the paper will 
employ one ongoing example of an emerging technology, namely ambient intelligence 
(AmI).  AmI can be seen as an emerging technology because a significant percentage 
of current ICT development is invested in areas that are directly related to it.  As a 
vision of technological developments, it has been around for several decades.  The 
principle behind AmI is that computing technologies are removed from the perceptual 
foreground and blend into the background.  Intelligent applications surround human 
agents and provide them with customized services.  Wellknown examples of these 
4  Describing Relevant Futures 
 
ideas are the refrigerator that automatically orders missing stock from the supermarket 
or the intelligent house that regulates heating and lighting autonomously according to 
the occupiers= preferences.  AmI is a technologyCor maybe better, a socio-technical 
systemCwhich comprises a large number of potential applications and artefacts.  It is 
a high-level technology that has the potential to significantly affect the way humans 
interact with their human and nonhuman environment.  For this reason it is of high 
social and ethical relevance.  Given that it is not truly in existence at present, it can 




2.1  Relevant Description and Context 
 
Whenever researchers (or anybody else, for that matter) describe a phenomenon, they 
need to draw a boundary around the phenomenon in question.  In this context, it is 
important to point out that phenomena are always human constructs.  This recog-
nition goes back to Kant (1995), who pointed out the important distinction between the 
thing as in itself (Noumenon) and its appearance (Phaenomenon).  This distinction 
has been criticized by philosophers for a variety of reasons.  This paper does not 
engage in that particular discourse but needs to make clear that it concentrates on 
phenomena.  These are seen as the object of cognition and they are clearly human-
made.  This is not to deny the existence of the thing in itself.  Indeed, much of the 
following subsections are concerned with the question of how to conceptualize the 
relationship between thing in itself and phenomenon. 
The initial question arising from the desire to describe a technology is how one 
can know whether the description is appropriate.  The choice of the boundaries of the 
description of the phenomenon determines the conclusion that can be drawn from it.  
If, for example, one wants to conduct an analysis of a particular technology or its use 
or if one wants to regulate design and use, the findings will depend on the content of 
the description.  This Aproblem of relevant description@ (van der Hoven 2010) is not a 
new one in philosophy.  Anscombe (1958), for example, critiqued Kant=s categorical 
imperative as useless without stipulations concerning relevant description. 
This problem of relevant description applies to any description of technical 
phenomena.  How can an observer know whether a phenomenon under observation is 
appropriately described?  This is a broad problem that relates to epistemology and 
theories of truth.  This question is clearly pertinent for emerging technologies but it is 
similarly important for well-established technologies.  The example of AmI 
demonstrates the problem.  The earlier introduction of AmI is limited.  Individuals 
knowledgeable in the area might focus on technical infrastructure, user interfaces, or 
novel devices.  At the same time, one could argue that the important aspect of AmI is 
the way in which it models human beings or the novel types of data AmI will require 
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and bring into existence.  One could look at technical artifacts (e.g., particular 
sensors), subsystems (e.g., wireless sensor systems, wearable computers), 
socio-technical systems (e.g., the sales process of the refrigerator to order missing 
milk), etc.  An added problem is that there will be a range of equally valid descrip-
tions.  Some positions on AmI are clearly colored, for example, the sales pitches of 
companies aiming to sell AmI products.  They emphasize the potential strengths and 
tend to ignore potential weaknesses.  It is clearly too simple, however, to attribute 
bias to vendors without acknowledging bias emanating from others.  In fact, the 
whole issue of bias comes back to the question of what would be a correct (or true) 
description of the technology, which is at the core of this paper.  Finally, AmI is an 
emerging technology, which means that it is currently not mature or widely used.  
AmI is surrounded by uncertainty as to possible and likely uses.  This adds to the 
complexity and ambiguity because a description of an emerging technology cannot 
draw on applications and examples for evaluation. 
If asked to describe the technology AmI, which of these (or additional) perspec-
tives should be taken?  And even if this question could be answered, then the 
immediate follow-on question would be:  How do we know that the particular 
perspective has been described appropriately and in the level of detail and depth that is 
required? 
The literature offers a number of conceptualizations and theories that provide 
conceptual tools for capturing this uncertainty of emerging technologies.  Some of 
the more prominent ones are discussed in the following sections. 
 
 
2.2  Interpretive Flexibility 
 
In the field of information systems, one well-developed approach to the problem of 
appropriative descriptions of technology is connected with the idea of interpretive 
flexibility.  Interpretive flexibility denotes the property of technology of being con-
stituted by use.  Proponents of interpretive flexibility argue that technology is not 
fixed but will develop during perception and use.  The tenets of interpretive flexibility 
are widely recognized in science and technology studies where different positions 
such as social study of technology (SST) or the social construction of technology hold 
such views (Bijker 1997; Grint and Woolgar 1997; Howcroft et al. 2004) and also in 
related fields such as actorBnetwork theory (Latour 2007; Law and Hassard 1999).  
Some scholars distinguish between interpretive and interpretative flexibility with the 
former referring to the epistemological aspect of the social construction of technology 
and the latter being a stronger position that sees the construction as ontologically 
constitutive of technology (Cadili and Whitley 2005). 
The concept of interpretive flexibility tends to be invoked to describe variable 
uses of extant technologies.  It is often brought to bear against the assumption that a 
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particular technology or IS will have specific and predictable results and uses.  
Technologies can be interpreted depending on context, culture, organizational 
environment, and many other variables.  Interpretive flexibility can explain why a 
successful technology used in one organization does not have the same consequences 
in another one that looks similar in many respects. 
What is less well explored, at least in the field of IS, is the question of the 
relationship of interpretive flexibility with future and emerging technologies.  There 
is a direct link between emergence and interpretive flexibility.  Interpretive flexibility 
is a function of social interaction and pertains to particular discourses.  That means 
that a technology may emerge in one context even though it may be well established 
elsewhere.  It also means that the same underlying artefact can emerge into different 
technologies in terms of usage and application. 
 
 
2.3  Affordances of Technology  
 
The preceding discussion of interpretive flexibility is deeply rooted in social con-
structivism or constructionism (Gergen 1999).  Social constructivism pervades much 
of science and technology studies and has been a strong answer to determinist 
positions (Grint and Woolgar 1997).  One strong opposing argument against social 
constructivism is that it is too open, that it allows socially constructing technologies in 
ways that would not happen in reality.  To put it differently, the question is what are 
the limitations of social construction?  In the case of most extant and widely used 
technologies, there are a number of widely shared possible interpretations.  A car, for 
example, can be used as a means of transport, a status symbol, or an investment.  
There are other, less frequent, uses such as the automobile as a place to sleep, as a 
weapon, or a means to block roads.  At the same time, there are numerous 
interpretations of cars that one does not come across.  Cars are not conceptualized as 
blankets, as educational toys, or as a means to get to the moon (even though in fiction 
all of these might be conceivable).  For the case of AmI, one can conceive of 
interpretations of the technology as surveillance mechanism or an alleviator of chores.  
The question is whether one can exclude possible interpretations a priori (i.e., before 
the technology has been used). 
One answer to this question is contained in the theory of affordances (Hutchby 
2001).  The theory of affordances was prominently put forward by James Gibson 
(1977). It is worth noting that for Gibson, affordances played a role in biology and the 
animal kingdom.  His main interest in affordances relates to the psychology of 
perception.  He suggests the definition that Aaffordance of anything is a specific 
combination of the properties of its substance and its surfaces taken with reference to 
an animal@ (p. 67).  This definition shows that Gibson=s primary interest is in animal 
perception, but of course it applies to humans as well.  An example he discusses in 
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some depth is the affordance of sitting-on.  In order for an object to have this 
affordance, the object has to display several properties.  These include that it has to be 
sufficiently rigid, level, flat, extended, andCfor humansCapproximately of 
knee-height.  An object displaying these properties allows humans to sit on them, 
independent of other properties, such as color, material, smell, etc. 
The interesting characteristic of affordance is that it is a combination of subjective 
and objective properties that are not random.  An object that does not have the 
properties does not afford sitting-on, but at the same time, a chair for humans would 
not afford sitting-on to giants.  Gibson believes that affordances are real in the 
ontological sense (i.e., not subject to social construction).  The problem here is that 
this would suggest that a specific combination of subject and object would have a 
clearly defined set of affordances.  From a philosophical perspective this raises the 
question how we can know what the affordances are.  And if we have no way of 
knowing whether we have identified a complete set of affordances, it furthermore 
raises the question whether there is a point of speaking of real and objective 
affordances if we cannot answer the previous question. 
The theory of affordances has become popular among technologists, in particular 
among those who create and build systems such as specialists in human computer 
interaction (Gaver 2010).  It is sometimes described as a way to develop new research 
avenues in established fields of technology research (Suthers 2006).  Such research 
has to contend with the question whether affordances are real or whether they are 
socially constructed.  In order to sidestep this philosophically difficult problem, the 
distinction between real and perceived affordances was introduced (Norman 1999).  
The point of this distinction is to explain the fact that individuals may not notice the 
presence of affordances of technologies, which for all intents and purposes renders 
these affordances irrelevant. 
The problem of perceived affordances is that it reintroduces uncertainty into the 
description of technology that the theory of affordances was meant to overcome.  If 
we are only interested in perceived affordances, then we have no objective measure 
that will allow us to determine whether a description of technology is complete.  
Affordances then become individual and reliant upon a number of accidental pro-
perties of the user, such as education, experience, age, etc.  The affordance of a par-
ticular piece of software, for example, then changes between users and over time.  In 
the case of technologies such as AmI, this raises additional problems given that one of 
the core features of AmI is its invisibility.  It is thus possible to not notice it at all, 
which may imply that it has no affordances.  In order to evade this trap, some sort of 
awareness raising or education will be required, which means that the affordances of 
the technology will depend not only on the technology itself and its users but also on 
the process of introducing the technology and the motivations of those who introduce 
it. 
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2.4  Multi-Stability of Technology 
 
Don Ihde (1999) has developed a different terminology that is meant to address the 
same problem as that of technological affordances.  Ihde argues that technology is 
multi-stable.  His argument refers to the issue of technology prognosis and the role 
that philosophy can play in it.  Retrospective evaluation of technology and its cones-
quences may be possible, but prospective work encounters the problem of multi-
stability.  By multi-stability he means that technology cannot take on any social role 
and use, thus addressing the problem of indefinite possibilities that arises from social 
constructivism and interpretive flexibility.  But while the possibilities that exist are 
not infinite, they are still greater than one.  Technology, once it develops, will become 
stable but which of a number of possible trajectories it takes is not foreseeable.  This 
multi-stability refers to uses but also effects, side effects, and other outcomes.   
The idea of trajectories within multi-stable technologies is the key to addressing 
the problem of prognosis.  Ihde contends that full prognosis may be impossible, but 
that the trajectories are at least partially determined which can allow a limited 
prediction of possible futures. 
 
 
2.5  The Description and Prognosis of Emerging Technologies 
 
This position seems to suggest that it is possible to get some sort of acceptable handle 
on dealing with emerging ICTs.  This section has discussed the problems of 
describing technologies.  Using arguments from several backgrounds, it was argued 
that it is difficult to give a correct account of any technology, including the most 
widely spread ones.  This difficulty is exacerbated when the object of investigation is 
no longer an existing technology but shifts to future technologies.  The further the 
temporal horizon of investigation, the less clear the description becomes (Collingridge 
1981). 
With regards to our problem of AmI, we can now distinguish several aspects of 
the uncertainty of the concept.  The uncertainty of AmI is partly explained by the 
interpretive flexibility, which means that the individual=s view of the technology is not 
determined by his or her perceptions.  This is all the more the case because AmI exists 
more as a concept than a present socio-technical reality.  Because of this uncertainty, 
it is unclear what the affordances of AmI are.  We have seen that there is 
disagreement about the ontological status of affordances (i.e., whether affordances are 
real properties of technologies or whether they are observer-dependent).  Even if one 
were to concede that affordances are objective, the next problem would remain:  that 
the developing nature of AmI make them difficult if not impossible to determine. This 
corresponds with Ihde=s point about the multi-stability of technology.  At present it is 
not possible to predict which trajectory AmI will take.  While there is significant 
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marketing activity which supports particular paths, it is unclear whether these will 
materialize. 
The contribution of this section is to show that there are at least four different 
positions that seek to explain the same phenomenon, namely the impossibility of 
comprehensively describing technology and especially of finding a description of 
relevant futures.  The paper does not claim that these are the only ways of framing the 
problem.  It aims to underline, however, that all of these positions have some 
influence on the debate in information systems, but even collectively they have not 
sufficed to convince the field of the importance of addressing the problem.  If we 
have no way of knowing whether a particular description of technology is the right 
one, then how can we do research on the technology and how can we make policy 
decisions that provide the basis of a desirable future? 
 
 
3  Participative Technology Assessment:  A Way Forward? 
 
The problem of uncertainty of emerging technology cannot be solved in the same way 
a technical problem may be solved.  The different perspectives outlined above all 
point to the inevitability of uncertainty.  However, we still have to make decisions 
about the future, despite this uncertainty.  There are numerous ways of doing this, all 
of which have different advantages and disadvantages.  This paper suggests that there 
are established ways of dealing with technologies that can compensate for some of the 
uncertainties of emerging technologies.  Specifically, the paper suggests that 
participatory technology assessment (pTA) can overcome some of the problems.  As 
will be argued in more detail below, pTA can overcome the epistemological problem 
by broadening the knowledge base of new technologies.  At the same time, it is based 
on democratic principles and therefore can contribute to the legitimacy of decisions 
based on the descriptions of technology, even where these may be contested. 
pTA is a branch of technology assessment (TA) that uses participatory methodo-
logies and approaches.  TA has a long history, going back to the 1960s, as an 
institutionalized attempt to understand issues of science and technology.  Much early 
TA work was inspired by the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment with many 
countries creating similar institutions at the parliamentary or governmental level with 
the specific remit of providing policy advice (Joss 2002).  Much early TA work was 
expert-centered but, as the limitations of this expert-centered approach became 
obvious, participatory methods were increasingly employed.  There are several com-
peting concepts that cover the same area, such as constructive TA (Joss and Belucci 
2002; Schot 2001; Schot and Rip 1996).  For the purposes of this paper, the dif-
ferences between these concepts are of secondary importance and we will, therefore, 
use the term pTA following Joss and Belucci=s (2002, p. 5) definition that Athe term 
>participatory technology assessment= (pTA) refers to the class of methods and 
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procedures of assessing socio-technological issues that actively involve various kinds 
of social actors as assessors and discussants.@ pTA has been established as a useful and 
legitimate way of undertaking TA.  The cognitive, normative, and pragmatic benefits 
outlined above have given rise to significant experimentation with pTA to the point 
that there now is wide acceptance of its importance and contribution (Joss 2002). 
Methodologies of pTA are not necessarily simple and clear-cut.  They depend on 
a number of factors including the research question, intended outcomes, type of 
respondents, experience of facilitators, cultural background, and political embedding 
to name but a few.  Methodologies need to be carefully tuned and customized for any 
specific project (Hennen 2002). 
Having proposed pTA as the response to the problem of this paper, namely the 
appropriate description of emerging ICTs, it is worthwhile reviewing the pTA 
literature in order to cross-check whether the expected benefits have been identified by 
pTA practitioners and to assess whether work in the area has led to the identification of 
problems that can jeopardise the success of the approach. 
 
 
3.1  Benefits of pTA 
 
Belucci et al. (2002) distinguish two main arguments in favor of participative work:  
pragmatic arguments that underline the function of participation as a means to 
improve decision making and normative arguments that underline the democratic 
aspect.  These lines of arguments are linked to two main underlying problem areas:  
uncertainty and inequality.  These lines of argument, while analytically different, are 
practically closely intertwined.  A further dimension in addition to the pragmatic and 
the normative one is the cognitive.   
The cognitive dimension has to do with knowledge of the problem area in ques-
tion.  Participation involves the individuals who are affected by the problem area and 
who have the most advanced local knowledge.  By being able to tap into this often 
unused pool of local knowledge, a better understanding of the problem is developed.  
Genus and Cole (2005) hold that epistemological advantages of participation include 
an anticipation of impacts of technology, thus exhibits a move from reaction to 
proactive involvement.  The Adeep learning@ that they associate with participation 
covers not only facts but also associated values.  There is furthermore an aspect of 
reflexivity which ensures that the actors in participative projects develop a better 
understanding of their mutual roles and interests.  The importance of this cognitive 
role of participation is caused by the often problematic role of the subject area.  
Political, social, or ethical implications of technology do not result from their design 
but from a combination of design features, meanings associated with them, and social 
and material structures and practices of implementation (Brey 2002). 
An important aspect of the cognitive dimension is related to risk or dangers posed 
by the technology.  The intensive discussion of technical risks during the last two 
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decades (Beck 1986) indicates quite clearly that risks emanating from technologies are 
not objective and easily measurable entities but are intrinsically related to 
stakeholders= perceptions and beliefs.  Identifying such risks, dangers, and uncer-
tainties is therefore something that requires the involvement of stakeholders beyond 
the technical experts (Callon et al. 2009).  At the same time it is beyond doubt that 
early addressing of risks would be desirable and in many cases would open more 
possibilities than attempting to fix problems after they arise.  This requires a better 
understanding of problems as provided by the cognitive function of participation. 
Participative engagement in science and technology can overcome cognitive 
closures by forcing different participants to take each others= views seriously.  This 
helps overcome expert bias in that expert opinions are taken seriously as an important 
contribution to socially constructed knowledge but are recognized as one among 
several such sources (Klüver 2002).  Participation requires mutual respect and effects 
mutual learning between different actors.  This mutual learning is an important aspect 
and outcome of participative work, which may render it worthwhile even in those 
cases where manifest pragmatic outcomes such as measurable influence on policy 
making do not materialize (Hansen 2006). 
This means that participation needs to play a central role not only in determining 
policy choices with regard to ICT, but also that it needs to start earlier, at the problem 
definition and framing stage.  Emerging ICTs are by their nature uncertain and not 
clearly defined.  Local knowledge and stakeholder engagement, the input of Ahybrid 
forums@ (Callon et al. 2009) are necessary to ascertain that the problems are 
appropriately understood and expressed before governance or policy can be 
considered. 
This question of appropriate framing refers back to the earlier discussion of the 
nature of technology, to interpretive flexibility and multi-stability.  The value of such 
a participative approach is therefore not only confined to research and policyoriented 
activity but has also been recognized by businesses that increasingly leverage user 
knowledge in product innovation (von Hippel 2006), thereby making use of the same 
underlying phenomenon. 
In addition to the cognitive and epistemological advantages of participation, there 
are also political and normative advantages which lead to an increase in the legitimacy 
of policy.  As Bütschi and Nentwich (2002) point out, despite the increased 
knowledge base, participative engagement in science and technology rarely leads to 
unforeseen or unforeseeable results.  It can still provide important inputs by giving 
new ways of understanding the problem and bestowing legitimacy on decisions.  This 
is based on the increasingly obvious political nature of science and technology (Callon 
et al. 2009) which requires decisions to gain political legitimacy.  This legitimacy is 
achieved by giving a voice to those who are affected (Genus and Coles 2005), which 
ensures higher levels of acceptability of outcomes than purely expert-drive procedures 
(Hennen 2002). 
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One of the mechanisms that bestow higher levels of legitimacy on participatively 
arrived-at outcomes is that participation can be interpreted as a type of democrati-
zation.  Democracy, along with freedom and justice, is a primary virtue of a good 
society, and it implies that citizens have an equal say in decisions (Brey 2008). 
Representative democracy as the main implementation of the democratic principle in 
modern democratic states runs into a number of problems, notably with regard to the 
representation of minorities (Callon et al. 2009).  Other, more direct forms of 
democracy, as emulated in some methods of participation, can overcome this problem 
and thereby strengthen the legitimacy of outcomes. 
At this point political mechanisms such as direct democracy and technical 
developments converge on the concept of empowerment.  Technology has become a 
primary means of empowerment but at the same time leads to potential differences in 
empowerment (Brey 2008).  Recognizing such issues is a task of participation. 
In addition to the cognitive, normative, and pragmatic advantages, there seems to 
be another attraction of participation, which is its theoretical background.  Partici-
pation is based on discursive exchanges and it can therefore build on the rich back-
ground of discourse theories.  The range of discourse theories, including the notable 
examples of Habermas=s and Foucault=s views on discourse (Ashenden and 
Owen1999; Kelly 1994), provide scholars with a rich background from which to draw 
descriptions and conceptualizations.  It points to a rich body of knowledge 
concerning empirical interventions and interpretations of discourses. 
 
 
3.2  Problems of Participative Technology Assessment 
 
The link to discourse theory can also serve to highlight some of the disadvantages and 
limitations of participative interventions in science and technology.  The much-
discussed differences between Habermas and Foucault, for example, can be used to 
identify problems of participative methods (Genus and Coles 2005).  The nature of 
the discursive relationship among participants can determine the success of the overall 
intervention.  The arguments in favor of participation are based on deliberative ideals 
which are rarely realized in practice (Hansen 2006).  This lack of fulfilment of 
theoretical conditions can have a direct effect on the outcomes. 
There are a number of problems that can arise in the course of participation.  
Discourses may take place in an environment where preconceived notions dominate 
all possible outcomes, thereby leading to an infinite regress of identical arguments.  
There can be skewed discourses based on differing levels of discursive abilities of 
participants or because of strategic interests of particular participants.  Particular 
interests may attempt to highjack the discourse for their purposes. 
But even if none of these situated and particular problems arise, it may still be the 
case that participation does not lead to the desired outcomes.  This may be because 
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some stakeholders are not available to participate and cannot be represented in an 
appropriate way.  It may also be the case that no shared view of the problem emerges 
and not even an agreement on central disagreements is possible.  The legitimacy of 
participation may be jeopardized when it is perceived to be in conflict with 
representative democracy.  And finally, even in the positive case that the process 
fulfils the hopes invested in it, it is entirely possible that the outcomes are not 
clear-cut, recommendations are ambiguous, and answers remain vague. 
Returning to the ongoing example of Ami, this discussion of pTA could be 
translated into an approach to participatively understand and shape AmI.  This would 
require an appropriate mechanism of stakeholder involvement, which pTA can pro-
vide.  On the basis of a representative and legitimate process, stakeholders could 
contribute their understanding of the technology as well as collectively develop a 
clearer picture of real and desired or undesired properties of the technology.  Such a 
view would to some degree address the epistemological uncertainty surrounding AmI.  
More importantly, a participative approach might define roadmaps for a technology 
future that is deemed to be desirable and acceptable by the stakeholders.  Such a 
roadmap could then provide the basis for democratic policy development.  This 
scenario at the same time also shows the limitations of the approach.  While 
collective action may claim a higher degree of knowledge, it is just as fallible as 
individual.  The legitimacy of participative engagement can conflict with the legiti-
macy of representative democratic processes.  There is thus no perfect solution.  
However, the example of AmI should have shown that we have a better chance of 
coming to technologies that are conducive to individual and social aims when we 
employ participative methods than if we continue to leave them purely in the hands of 
unsupervised market forces.   
 
 
4  Conclusion 
 
This paper was motivated by the apparent ease with which terms such as Afuture IT@ or 
Aemerging ICT@ are used in public discourses, including the theme of this IFIP 
conference.  It set out to explore the problems of this usage of terms.  Drawing on 
several streams of the philosophy of technology and other theoretical arguments, it 
demonstrated that a correct, appropriate, or even true description of technologies is 
difficult to achieve.  This is true in the case of existing and widely spread tech-
nologies, but even more so for technologies that are not yet fully developed and in 
some stage of emergence. 
The epistemological uncertainty of emerging technologies can be explained using 
concepts such as interpretive flexibility, affordances, or multi-stability.  While such 
concepts are theoretically helpful in understanding the limitations of research on these 
technologies, they offer little practical recourse to overcome these problems.  This is 
a significant problem because it renders obsolete any attempts to steer the develop-
14  Describing Relevant Futures 
 
ment of technology in desired paths.  This is true for high-level policy makers on a 
national or international level, but it raises similar issues for decision makers on a 
sectoral or organizational level.  If we don=t know what future technologies to expect, 
then how can we plan for them? 
Drawing on the literature surrounding pTA, it was argued that the epistemological 
as well as the ethical issues raised by emerging ICTs can be addressed by means of 
pTA.  This does not promise perfect solutions but it provides a way forward where 
otherwise the only solutions might have been to ignore the problem of emerging ICTs 
or to simply extrapolate past developments into the future. 
The paper makes a significant contribution to the theoretical discourse on 
emerging ICTs and thereby to the field of IS.  It brings together the main strands of 
debate:  the epistemology of technology (i.e., interpretive flexibility, affordances, 
multi-stability), and the discourse surrounding pTA.  This allows a better under-
standing of theoretical and conceptual issues that an evaluation of technology in 
general, and of emerging technology in particular, raise.  It provides ways of cross-
pollination between these strands of discourse that improves our understanding of 
technology.  It also points the way toward approaches and methodologies that will 
allow us to give answers to the difficult questions surrounding future technologies. 
While the main contribution of the paper is of a theoretical nature, it has 
interesting implications for practice.  If the argument of the paper holds, then this 
implies that improving our understanding of emerging ICTs will require engaging in 
participative methods of assessment.  There are numerous such methods that have 
been explored, ranging from focus groups to consensus conferences or citizens= 
panels.  What is less well explored is how these can be used for a range of problems to 
which they have not been applied.  This refers in particular to the question of 
participation being organized on a local or company level. 
The present paper thus points the way toward a rich and complex area of 
empirical research.  Which participative methods are suitable and conducive for 
which type of technology?  This is a question that should be of interest to decision 
makers in charge of technology policy on a range of levels.  A further question is how 
this participative idea relates to other approaches.  There are numerous ways of 
designing ICT that actively seek to include user and stakeholder views and positions.  
These include approaches such as human-centered and value-sensitive design, but also 
many of the more established methodologies that evolved from soft systems and 
related approaches.  The theoretical and practical compatibility of these approaches 
are in need of investigation. 
When technology assessment was in its infancy, much technology development 
was directly steered or undertaken by the state.  This is no longer the case and cer-
tainly not in the area of ICTs.  This raises the question whether participative inter-
ventions, such as the ones suggested here, can actually have a place and a practical 
outcome in the current socio-economic climate. 
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All of these questions are theoretically interesting and practically important.  
Together they can inform us whether we are still in control of technology development 
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